[197] questions are meaningful---as for instance Carnap^a in Chicago does, when he criticized Heidegger^b because of his use of the concept of being---then we are exactly in the discussions with another name, and other ways, of Plato^c or Aristotle,^d or of the Augustinians ^eof the old school (Bonaventura^f) and the Augustinians of the later school (Ockham^g). Now this discussion isnot [sic.] a play of concepts^h and is not only a matter of arguments in the realm of philosophical analysis, but behind it is also an ultimate concern, and from the point of view of this lecture, where l am not supposed to go into this discussion as my real subject, l have to do at least ONE thing: one must try to show that in this discussion, philosophical arguments and expressions of ultimate concern are always mixed with each other, and that it is important for every discussion (and especially every discussion about the relationship of religion to these problems) to distinguish the philosophical arguments from the expression of ultimate concern. Now take the philosophical argument against extreme positivism. Extreme positivism is finally pushed into that corner which was daringly expressed in the second part of this century by a movement called, in German, "dadaism"-ⁱ-the word da-da means "there, there"---"there-there-ism," if you want an exact translation, a philosophy which cannot do anything else any more but raise the finger and say "there-there," because everything BEYOND this would be the application of a universal and would mean the truth of something which is NOT only there-there, but it's here-here, and on many other places, i.e., has something in common. Actually, the Dadaists,^j in all their