[212] At the same time, SUBSTANTIA is a logical category which already appears in Aristotle^a (hypostasis) and has a long history of interpretation in epistemological, logical and ontological terms. Now this is the ambiguity of such an analysis, that in the same central concept [such] as "substance" in Spinoza,^b we have a tradition of Jewish monotheism on the one hand, and of the development of an Aristotelian category on the other. Here we see the difficulty, and for this reason I say it cannot be done clearly. But if I DISCUSS Spinoza,^c l wouldn't do it as it was done by contemporary theologians, who threw him out as a heretic, but as it has been done also by many later theologians---and if I use the word "Spinoza^d," by a conditioned reflex, in every theologian the word "pantheism" appears in his mind! Now this word is never really defined, or very rarely, and in which sense it can be used at all is another question. In any case, in discussing Spinoza^e l wouldn't discuss him (in terms of theological attack) as a pantheist. On the other hand, if l had to discuss him philosophically, l would not do so in terms of Schleiermacher^f's hymn [to] the saintliness of Spinoza^g. Both are justified---- this is SO in him, and this is a theological discussion. But there is another discussion: the discussion of the logical meaning of universal substance, and the relationship to the accidents. And there a man like Schelling^h, for instance, has contributed much, merely PHILOSOPHICALLY, to the criticism of Spinozaⁱ by showing that the accidents cannot be understood in terms of a geometrical necessity following from the substance, as Spinoza^j wanted, but that the accidents---namely you and l and the chairs and the desks and the sun and the moon---they all are modi of the substance, as he calls it---