[184] disturbing elements but because of the kind of question which one asks [of] nature. Galileo^a was not a greater physicist than the Pythagoreans^b and, in the biological realm, Aristotle^c. But Aristotle and the Pythagoreans asked different questions and got different answers from nature. The questions asked in the period of the Renaissance^d were always intimately related to technical activity, which is NOT the case in Greece. Now these are presuppositions which make the ideal of pure science impossible. And that's what modern scientists acknowledge---and I think universally acknowledge. It was very interesting to me, when I had a talk with Einstein^e one day, and he sticked, even against the better evidence of today, to his naturalistic worldview^f which he had learned in the 19th century and which brought with him a Newtonian^g deterministic whole of atomic movements. He said: "I know that today, in the light of the theory of quanta, this system, this metaphysical presupposition, is shaken, is not unambiguously valid any more, as it seemed to be in the period of Newton^h and ever since. But nevertheless, I believe in it, and I am convinced that one day it will prove to be the RIGHT FRAMEWORK of the physical worldview again."ⁱ Now here you have an example of a man whom you certainly cannot accuse of NOT being a methodologically adequate physicist [some laughter] who saw the importance of the presuppositions. Now up to today, his hope has not been justified---I am very doubtful whether it will be. But now these younger physicists^j are ALSO aware of THEIR metaphysical^k presuppositions and implications, and they confess that, very openly, and I think that is a good situation.