[183] of the idea of creation---I turned it against this in all the preceding lectures---but this man knew that he CANNOT presuppose ANYthing without doing it in a philosophical or metaphysical totality. It is always a vision of the totality of being which, consciously or unconsciously, determines the FRAME of their thought. Now this means, even in scientific work an element of philosophy remains effective. Although the child of the mother-philosophy has become independent, it can never become completely independent; it always remains in the frame of an understanding of reality as a whole. Of course these elements are not supposed to interfere with research. If they did this, then the scientific mind [would have] to turn against philosophy, as it did for instance in the philosophy of nature of the romanticists ^ain the middle of the 19th century; and the tension scientists feel against philosophy still TODAY, especially against metaphysics,^b is rooted in the questionable claims of the Romantic philosophers of nature to solve physical problems in metaphysical terms. But this was an aberration. The Romantic idea as such has returned, that WITHIN scientific research there are presuppositions, and these presuppositions can be described. When, today, physicists^c speak of "fields" or "structures" which PRECEDE the movements, then this is in the line of what the Romantic philosophers of nature tried to do, but they did it much too quickly, they superimposed metaphysics^d upon physical research^e---and that's wrong. Even the most empirical way of dealing with physical problems is never pure physics---^f there is not such a thing. Pure physics are never PURE physics, not because of the interference of