[179] both about structure and reality, and about the meaning of existence. Therefore the philosophers ALWAYS have theological substance. Their power is just the unity of these things---look at the Greek philosophers, at the Indian philosophers, at the philosophers of the modern period (not to speak of the Medieval ones from Leibniz^a to Spinoza^b), to Kant^c and Hegel.^d There seems to be only one exception, namely the positivistic line of philosophers, from Locke^e and Hume^f to present-day logical positivism^g. This seems to be an exception to this rule. But this is only [so] if you look at them very superficially. SOME of them restrict themselves to special problems which NEEDED to be asked in their time: the epistemological problem, in the time of Locke^h and Hume and Kant;ⁱ the logical problem in OUR period; and the linguistic problem, which is so urgently needed today. This is certainly necessary, is an important endeavor, and justified. But partly it doesn’t cover the whole of it what has been called philosophy. And beyond this, if it is MORE than this, in the moment in which it makes criticisms of other philosophers, of theologians, it becomes philosophy itself and shows an ultimate concern. It shows an interpretation of being by relating language to reality, semantics to that to which the seimata, the signs, point. And in the moment in which they do this, in which the logical positivists or epistemologists speak about reality at all---and they do it more and more today---in the same moment they become sons of classical philosophy, and their rejection of all philosophy is self-contradictory. You cannot escape, even if you are a logical positivist, the fundamental structure of humanity, namely to ask the question of the meaning