[276] old boy, and if professors boast, and ministers boast, that they have this superiority, and that if they believe that if they do something good to Paul the Apostle,^a that he knew better than Socrates---then they are simply childish. [?] What is really at stake here is ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT. Socrates didn't speak of knowledge in the [sense] of detached knowledge, but he speaks of insight^b in the sense of participation in one's daemon, as he called [it], i.e., the unconscious power striving in him. And only on the basis of such insight is it possible to understand his statement that knowledge produces action. And why? Because this knowledge is already an action, and one of the, perhaps the most difficult action, namely obedience to the oracle of Delphi, which called Socrates^c the wisest of all men, and on the door which was written gnōthi seauton, "Know thyself." But knowing oneself doesn't mean "Know the measures of sensitivity to light and darkness," as in some forms of psychology rightly is done, but it means "Know one's predicament." And just THAT is what the psychoanalytic movement tries to do and for which it has found some new methods. A third point is the discovery of nature in man, namely the driving power of what Freud^d calls libido and what Nietzsche^e called "will to power." These things were always known in their manifest expressions, but the existentialist and psychoanalytic rediscovery of the unconscious has shown something else: it has shown that they are present not only in their conscious state, but that there is something analagous to them in their unconscious state. Of course if one speaks of will-to-power, that is a conscious formula and therefore is a very unfortunate concept,