[214] concerning the relationship of mind and reality. And these presuppositions are not themselves epistemological---because that would produce a vicious circle---but they come from fundamental ontological intuitions and traditions. And in the moment in which THIS was realized, Hartmann^a himself was able [to develop] an ontology^b of the same categories with which Kant ^cdeals, but an ONTOLOGY, and the Kantian school had no successors any more, since this important turning-point. Now the same is true of a man like Cassirer,^d who in his last years was in this country and who, as you know, has written the important works about symbols. HE ALSO started as a Kantian epistemologist ^eand then saw that there is a realm of symbolic understanding of reality which transcends the merely epistemological situation. This became also very important---he overcame the Kantian epistemological tradition (the Neo-Kantian school^f)---in terms of opening up large fields of philosophical inquiry in neglected realms such as language and its symbolic meaning, myth and its symbolic meaning, the arts and their symbolic meaning, etc. All this shows that in the very epistemological school, an awareness arose, towards the end of the century, about the limitations of methodologlSM, or, as I would say, of asking the question "On which way do I come to my aim?", and the simple answer was, "In order to know which way is the right way, you must know something about the aim which you want to reach on this way." MethodologlSM is self-defying because you canNOT develop a method except in continuous correlation with the subject matter to which it is supposed to be applied. That was the situation. And I have the feeling that today there IS a way from logical positivism^g to an insight