[195] LECTURE XVII, Thurs., Dec. 1, 1955 Tuesday I started the discussion of religion ^aand philosophy ^band gave as the basic solution that the philosopher, as human being, has an ultimate concern which expresses itself in his philosophy; and that the theologian, as dealing with the logos, uses the categories and structures of being^c as they are developed by the philosopher. Now let me do something rather difficult, namely to go into the discussion of a few basic attitudes in philosophy in order to show where and in which way, behind the philosophical discussion, ultimate concern is manifest---or in other terms, in which sense the philosophers are consciously or unconsciously theologians, by their very being philosophers. Only if this can be shown concretely, in relation to special philosophical attitudes, is the argument carried through. But I warn you: this is not easy, and it demands SOME kind of philosophical knowledge. Let's first take the classical discussion between nominalism^d and realism ^eas it was going on in the Middle Ages at the end and the beginning of the medieval philosophy, while in the middle development, on the high point of the Middle Ages, there was a kind of compromise valid in medieval thinking. But then, at the end of the Middle Ages, nominalism,^f which had been tamed, so to speak, by strong realistic elements,^g broke out again and destroyed the whole mediating system of medieval thought. Today, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the nominalistic tradition is the determining one. It was somehow so already in the Middle Ages. Duns Scotus^h (which means Duns, the man from Scotland) and William of Ockhamⁱ, taught in England. Following them, in some way, English empiricism^j and