[550] the authority^a in principle and the authority in fact. Let's use these two distinctions, which can both be used---the word "rational" has connotations which make it very difficult today to use it. In Williams College, two days ago, I had a discussion with the students and someone asked me about the relation of reason^b and faith^c, and I asked back with the words, "Whenever I hear somebody ask such a question, I ask back, 'What do you mean with "reason" '?" And he reacted almost immediately, he was not shocked, because he knew exactly what reason is, namely intellectual endeavor: that was his definition of reason. Now of course, if this is reason, then it doesn't cover what Fromm ^dmeans at all, and it never covers what I mean with reason, and it doesn't cover what the history of philosophy meant with reason. Reason meant the structure of mind and reality. But this immediate reaction of a younger boy to my

question which tried to trap him [smiling], was very revealing to me. It revealed the fact that it's almost beyond salvation to try to bring back the original meaning of the word reason: it is "intellectual endeavor," and this is what it is, and if you speak of morals^e or aesthetics or politics^f or the universe and its structure, then you shouldn't use that word any more. I am very sorry, but I am afraid I have to resign! --- this boy revealed that to me. In any case, this is why l hesitate a little to use Fromm^g's distinction, although it points very much to the same direction. Now let's use my own, namely authority^h in principle and authority in fact. The first thing is authority in fact. None of you would be in this room, in this moment, if I were not for you, in a limited realm, an authority in fact. But I HOPE nobody is in this room who considers me to be