[550] the authority^a in principle and the authority in fact. Let's use these two distinctions, which can both be used---the word "rational" has connotations which make it very difficult today to use it. In Williams College, two days ago, I had a discussion with the students and someone asked me about the relation of reason^b and faith, and I asked back with the words, "Whenever I hear somebody ask such a question, I ask back, 'What do you mean with "reason" '?" And he reacted almost immediately, he was not shocked, because he knew exactly what reason is, namely intellectual endeavor: that was his definition of reason. Now of course, if this is reason, then it doesn't cover what Fromm ^cmeans at all, and it never covers what I mean with reason, and it doesn't cover what the history of philosophy meant with reason. Reason meant the structure of mind and reality. But this immediate reaction of a younger boy to my

question which tried to trap him [smiling], was very revealing to me. It revealed the fact that it's almost beyond salvation to try to bring back the original meaning of the word reason: it is "intellectual endeavor," and this is what it is, and if you speak of morals or aesthetics or politics or the universe and its structure, then you shouldn't use that word any more. I am very sorry, but I am afraid I have to resign! --- this boy revealed that to me. In any case, this is why l hesitate a little to use Fromm^d's distinction, although it points very much to the same direction. Now let's use my own, namely authority^e in principle and authority in fact. The first thing is authority in fact. None of you would be in this room, in this moment, if I were not for you, in a limited realm, an authority in fact. But I HOPE nobody is in this room who considers me to be