[238] which is actual. Not everything is ontological-possible which is logical-possible. This fundamental distinction, which one can learn from Aristotle^a, makes it necessary to use two different terms: the logical-possible and the ontological-potential. That's my first and, I think, the decisive answer to this. Now the word "ontological^b" is here used only as a name-calling word. Now that can be done. You can say ontology is black, and the Devil, and the fundamental confusion of poetry and thought, etc. But at least two or three thousand years of human beings, of high standing (as l would call them), were not of the opinion that ontology is ONLY poetry^c. But l would agree with the question that in ontology, there are elements of intuitive anticipation of the totality of reality, as in all philosophical thought; also in those thoughts which speak of restriction to epistemological ^dquestions and to pure logic. It is a self-deception if one believes that epistemology is non-ontological. Now we already discussed that, and I might repeat it. It sounds very modest that one always asks "What can I know?" or "How do I know?" Now if this is only a rhetoric-question in order to confuse somebody who believes that he knows something---but if it is a REAL question, a SERIOUS question, then it demands answer. And then l answer: "How can we answer the question 'How do I know?' without knowing?" And that is the question asked against the purely epistemological restriction of philosophy to pure epistemology. The answer can only be itself ontological, otherwise we come into the vicious circle of "How do l know that I know that I know that l know?" And this is very often the way in which epistemology has become emptier and emptier, and has