[203] different way, with skill and with love, i.e., the desire to understand WHY a human being is an extreme nominalist^a or an extreme realist^b, why he sticks to the limits of logical symbolism, or why he tries to transcend this limited realm. And the answer is: Did he experience the dimension of the power of being ^cor not? Did he experience the dimension of the ultimate value of personal existence or not? In the moment in which these dimensions are reached, then the arguments fall down on a secondary level, where they are justified, and where no theologian should ever interfere. On the other hand, I would warn those of you who come from the PHILOSOPHICAL tradition more than from the theological, not to put the theologians in one of these different groups, [and] make them, as is usually [done], [into] idealist^ds or mystics,^e and then refute them philosophically. The situation is not as easy as that. Another example, to which I just referred: the discussion between naturalism^f and what we TODAY call idealism^g. Here again are a lot of philosophical arguments which are very valid. There are epistemological arguments for both of them---naturalism as well as idealism. The question of knowledge ALWAYS has driven people to idealistic consequences, because the poblem of the real, ouside of our mind, is an eternal problem, and a problem where idealism has IMMEDIATELY speaking, a better answer. Of course idealism does not mean, in this use of the word here, subjectivism, that the world consists only of stream-of-consciousness, but it means that things in themselves are, for us, nothing we can approach, but that the reality as we have it, as we encounter it, is formed