[201] Now l hope that the distinction---which is the real emphasis in this discussion---has been as clear as it can become, in these very difficult heights of abstraction. But l will repeat it again: the philosophical arguments between nominalism ^aand realism^b---or today, between logical positivism^c and ontology^d---go around the meaning of universals. ^eAnd there, they have their place, where the theologian has no right whatsoever to interfere and to tell them where to go. And this is decisive--- and here l feel very much on the side of Protestantism against Roman Catholic tendencies which were more than ever before supported by the present pope, to give judgments about philosophical arguments. This is not the business of the theologian and should never be and never could be, because it would demand the breaking of the honesty and freedom of the philos-sophia, of the radical asking [of] the questions of being. and THAT CANNOT BE DONE. Philosophy CANNOT follow any lead in this. But if you discuss with philosophers, or one or the other group, you can show to them that there is a dimension in their thought which is not simply a matter of philosophical arguments, but which is a matter of encounter with reality as such in the TOTALITY of one's being, and not only in the realm of logical arguments. If you show THlS, then you have not only a business but [also] a duty and a possibility not to interfere in the arguments but to show that here an ultimate concern determines the picture beyond any argument---for instance, in some cases, which I often have found, a lack of an experience of that dimension which I describe as the experience of the power of being---^f a lack of feeling for the threat of nonbeing. You can often find that, and then of course you cannot