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"biblicistic," although they are nothing but the heirs of Medieval nominalism^a, in their arguments--- I have been accused of using the term being in a way which contradicts the personalistic character of religion, and especially of biblical religion^b. Now to this I want to answer---and I think ALL ontologists^c in theology, from the earliest periods up to present theology, and give the same answer in essence--- namely that being is not a hypostasized universal ^dwhich is, so to speak put beside reality as ANOTHER reality, but is the experience of a quality in all realities and through all reality, namely of the power of being over against nonbeing.^e And this is a matter of ultimate concern^f because every human being is in every moment threatened by innumerable forms of nonbeing, of destruction of the structure of being.^g Therefore ontology^h is on the ONE hand a philosophical decision, to be defended with philosophical arguments on the basis of the meaning of universals; iⁱt is on the OTHER hand an expression of ultimate concern^j about one's participation in the power of being itself.^k

And then the opposition. The opposition comes from a special power of being which in some way transcends all others, namely the power of being which we call "personal."^l Here the nominalist^m argument receives its religious dimension, namely that the bearer of ultimate concernⁿ can only be he in whom the ultimate itself becomes conscious---and this is the person. Therefore a philosophy in which the person is swallowed by being, is a philosophy which is not only a matter of philosophical arguments but which is a matter of ultimate concern^o about the dignity and ultimate significance of personal existence.