Facs
Transcript
“biblicistic,” although they are nothing but the heirs of Medieval nominalism, in their arguments – I have been accused of using the term being in a way which contradicts the personalistic character of religion, and especially of biblical religion. Now to this I want to answer – and I think all ontologists in theology, from the earliest periods up to present theology, and give the same answer in essence – namely that being is not a hypostasized universal which is, so to speak put beside reality as another reality, but is the experience of a quality in all realities and through all reality, namely of the power of being over against nonbeing. And this is a matter of ultimate concern because every human being is in every moment threatened by innumerable forms of nonbeing, of destruction of the structure of being. Therefore ontology is on the one hand a philosophical decision, to be defended with philosophical arguments on the basis of the meaning of universals; it is on the other hand an expression of ultimate concern about one's participation in the power of being itself.
And then the opposition. The opposition comes from a special power of being which in some way transcends all others, namely the power of being which we call “personal.” Here the nominalist argument receives its religious dimension, namely that the bearer of ultimate concern can only be he in whom the ultimate itself becomes conscious – and this is the person. Therefore a philosophy in which the person is swallowed by being, is a philosophy which is not only a matter of philosophical arguments but which is a matter of ultimate concern about the dignity and ultimate significance of personal existence.