Zusatzmaterial I Box 38, 39, 46

Religion and Culture. First Seminar: Religion and Philosophy. Intr. The vastness and the limitation of the subject, both generally and in all special seminars. Restriction to the following points: {1. The two basic aspects of religion} {2. The nature of t} 2: The immanence of the religious dimension in the creative functions of man's spirit: Religion in the larger sense.

[1] Religion and Culture II. Second Lecture: Religion, Science and Philosophy Ref. to the first lecture and its distinction between the two concepts of religion: Terms for the first, basic and larger concept: "Being unconditionally con- cerned about the meaning of existence, taking something absolu- tely seriously, being grasped by an infinite interest and passion, experiencing the selftranscendence of life towards an ultimately sub- lime or holy", abbreviation: "Ultimate Concern." _ The second con- cept: "A {movement or} social group with symbols of thought (myth and its theological and philosophical conceptualisation) and of action (ritual and ethical activities) expressing a particular direction of the ultimate concern (churches, sects, monastic groups, ecstatic movements).

[2] {The} All cultural conflicts with religion are dependent on the {identification} reduction of re- ligion with the narrower concept of religion. Since this narrower concept {covers} refers to religious groups which are a part of cultur{al}e {activities} themselves, the conflict occurs with them: Church as a {centered} social group with power against the state {with the} on the basis of its religious claim of ultimacy, {because of ultimate concern} based on revelatory and saving experiences: The same {with} conflict about legal and political ideas, with educational aims and artistic styles. And the same conflict about {its} affirmations of truth in religion, science and philoso- phy. This brings us directly to our subject of today. And it gives us not only the weapon to overcome the conflicts, but also a way of reunion of {activities} functions of the human spirit which belong together and are separated by man's estrangement.

[2] I. Philosophy {as such} 1. The precise definition of philosophy [...] is identical with the philosophical creation itself. Nevertheless: Depart- ments, {an} histories and even textbooks of philosophy: A common sense circumscription: Most universal problems. But this can lead to the most universal problem: Being. 2. The rise of the question out of man's power to face non-being, in concreto: The change and transitoriness and one's own non-being (not having been and not to be sometime), in abstracto: the question of possible non-being universally (not a ques- tion but a shock.): {What makes being being?} {The question is:} {What} {in being is itself?} Why is there something not nothing?

[3] I. The sciences and religion 1. The term science {is} shall not be restricted to natural scien- ces but shall include every methodologically disciplined scholarly research as e.g. psychology, sociology and history. Philosophy shall not be treated as a particular science, but as the cognitive eros towards the whole, {which of} {course.} The whole is effective in all its parts and the philosophical eros therefore reaches into all particulars. This leads to questions about {not only of the} {relation of the philosophical to the theological attitude but} {also to} the relation of philosophy to science and {we ma} to the place {problem of the ethical problems} {of the} of the scien- tist in the whole of human existence, especially in the present situation. {N} 2. {A} The great problem of the past {ment in and up to now and} which is almost obsolet today is that about the relation of theological and scientific sta- tements. Here the language analysis, done from both sides

[4] has helped: One knows: The scientific language is predominantly calculating = detached, the religious language predominantly existential _ involved. (The progress in the analytic school in acknowledging this). From this follows that all religious statements are analogous or symbolic, and are distorted if taken litterally. One can, more directly, say that {the two lie} {in} they belong to different di- mensions, the dimension of finite interrelations and the dimension of the meaning of being, our infinite concern. 3. This can be forgotten from both sides: Theology can take, {mostly} on ecclesiastical or Biblical authority, state- ments about things and events as religiously authorised: e.g. physical, biological, psychological or historical statements. ({the crea-} {tion and consummation, stories, myths, miracle stories,} astrono- mical views, biological statements about man, psycholo- gical theories about human nature etc.). In all these

[5] cases science has to reject any such claim if it lies in the realm of verifyable statements about facts and {the} relations including historical ones (Fundamentalism). _ On the other hand, science should {can}not inter- fer in the world of religious symbols, denie religion because of taking litterally, what is in reality symbolic. {literally denying the stories of creation, fall,} {salvation, consummation, in its} (The fight against theology in its primitive-suprana- turalistic forms instead of its latest, selfreflective and selflimiting forms). {highly} [And even more, science should {can}not denie{s} {to have} that there is a dimension {and accordingly} of ulti- mate concern (as it cannot denie the artistic and ethical dimensions).] There is no religious statement which can con- tradict a scientific statement and vice versa, although [...] there are {many} scientists and theologians (laymen), unaware of this situation {what} {they} {are supposed to} {can and cannot} {do}, who can contradict each other {and do so} by confusing the dimensions.

[5a] 4. But there remains still the question of the basic attitudes and their contrast. The attitude of the scientist, detached, calculating, counting on many possible errors in observation, cautious in making statements which preliminary assertions only, separating his scientific work from the other concerns of life in which emotion and will, moral tradition and religious or political loyalty are included. The religious man living in the tradition of a particular set of symbols in which he moves as {a} the {foundation of his existence} expressions of the meaning {of} life, has for him, resisting doubt, accepting Biblical or ecclesiastical authority, giving un- conditional loyalty to the manifestation of the holy in his religious tradition. But is this the real situation? Certainly it is felt so {like} {it} by innumerable people [young scientists!]. The scientist claims not to under-

[6] II. Philosophy and the sciences 1. The first step in relating religion and the sciences has been done: The boundary line has been drawn. This is extremely important in view of the history of the conflicts from Galileo to Darwin and Freud. It is still important in theology where church authorities as well as Christian laymen resist, e.g. historical research into the Biblical books, and the discovery of {showing} the mixture of historical, legendary and mythical elements in them. (The dangers of hiding these inquiries from the congregations, thus producing shocks, if people encounter the procedures of historical research and cannot honestly deny their methodological va- lidity.) _ On the other hand, these scholars themselves should not derive from their work alone negative or positive judgments about the validity of the Christian message of the appearance of a healing or saving reality in a personal life. {This example}

[7] {the lasting importance of the drawing of the boundary line.} 2. But this is not all what can be said. The re- volt of the scientists in Harvard against only this. They see {saw} in their own work a religious dimension and so did the psychologists and physicians who {now work togeth} call theologians for exchange. _ {This leads to the relation of} {philosophy and the sciences.} Those scientists did their work with philosophical eros and with consciousness of their own phi- losophical presuppositions. The sciences are born out of philoso- phy, which asked the question of the universe, the whole of being, or simply: being; and {it} philosophy the formed some main univer- sal characteristics of being like the categories (time, space, causality), the polarities, form and matter, {potentiality and actuality,} the relation of potentiality and actuality, essence and existence, of subject and object, of knowledge, {etc} of logical and linguistic struc- tures, as being and ought to be, as the different dimensions of reality and their relations, concepts like, nature, life, history,

[8] *(The religious element in teaching the sciences.) mind ...) 3. No scientific inquiry is possible without the use of these concepts, openly or hiddenly [conference with Hutchins]. They {introduce} point to an element in science which transcends science, the cognitive eros, directed to the whole. This element is effec- tive in the scientific procedures * which, conversly, contri- bute to the vision of the whole. _ (-) Most of the {scie} creative scientists [...] in the past were driven by the eros towards the universal within their particular field; they were more than scientific technicians or solvers of logical riddles. 4. Qualifications of the "whole": The eros for the whole, the cosmos, the uni- verse, is not directed {to the} towards the sum-total of all particulars, but towards the underlying unity{,} within the diversity. Philosophy, in asking this question,

[9] was driven by the experience that what seems to be real {was} proved not to be real; and so the question arose for the really real, {the ground of every-} {thing that is,} that which underlies and transcends everything that seems to be real, but which oscillates between real and only seeming. So the question of ulti- mate reality arose with the beginning of philosophy, and in it the ground of both, the unity and the manifoldness of the whole was seen. So the eros for the whole became the passionate de- sire to find cognitively the ultimately real, the truly real itself. Even in logical analysis an image of the real is present. This eros and passion has led to contradic- tory answers. {In this} But in the eros for the whole all philosophers, (and not only those of the West) are united. Their answers divide them, their eros and the inner force of reality itself unites them. _ And insofar as the philosophical

[10] element is effective in all sciences this eros is also effective in them. III. Philosophy and Religion 1. The search for the unity of the {appearing} existing in and for ulti- mate reality is an element in the religious concern; for the cognitive eros is never missing in {the} religion, but the religious concern is {all} more embracing. It will not only recognize ultimate reality, it will reunite with it, {in all sides of the him who is grasped by} and shape himself and his world accordingly {the ultimate, the religious concern.} {Lea} This leads to the assertion of a point of identity between philoso- phy (and by implication of all sciences) and religion: The desire to unite cognitively with ultimate reality, in

[11] Traditional symbols: The {l} longing of the human soul to "know" God (in uniting knowledge.) {(Thomas: He who knows anything knows God,"} {because everything is a divine selfmanifestation.)} This is understandable out of the birth-story of philosophy. 2. {On this basis the relation of philosophy and} {religion can be expressed in the following statements:} a] The background {and predecessor} of philosophy is mythology, in which the experience of ultimate rea- lity {is} is expressed in powerful symbols. These myths combines an aesthetic, {intuiti} and a cognitive element. Slowly (comp. Greek theology and cosmogony) the conceptual element becomes {predominant} independent {and} makes out of mythical symbols rational concepts and leaves the myth to poetry. _ The {quest} process of "demythologization." b] These philosophical concepts are now conversely being used by theology in order to interpret partly demythologized {the} but still powerful religious symbols

[12] {to} in a culture which {does not live unbrokenly in} has both experiences {the symbolic realm.} This is the way in which the Christian dogma was created with Greek concepts. e] Conflicts between theology and philosophy are based on a lack of distinguishing the elements in both: The mythical background and the religious substance in the philosophical concepts, and the philosophical concepts in {the cognitive self-} expressing the religious {expression of religion, in} substance through the "logos." Genuine conflicts are pos- sible only if either the religious substance in a particular philosophy contradicts the religious substance in a particular theology. (a Dionysian philosophy like Nietzsche's and {the Christian theology of agape} strict moralist Calvinism of Old Testament Char. Or the conceptualisation of a particular philosophical school contradicts the conceptualisation, used in a particular

[13] theology. But in all these cases: {No} conflict be- tween {theolo} philosophy as such and religion as such. d] The idea of a "theology of culture," par- ticularly of science and philosophy. The question: Which kind of ultimate concern or of selfinterpretation of man is hidden within the conceptual system? [e] The freedom of theology from and for particular phi- losophical concepts.] A common question of theology and philosophy is the position of the scientist, the question of ... _ _ _ 3. Scientific ethics: The question of the paradise about the knowledge of the good and evil powers. The tragic implications of the transition of dreaming inno- cence into tragic existence. (The discussion in Chicago

[14] and the article in "Great Ideas." pp. 8. 9.)

[8] (15) duction of means.: mashines, tools, gadgets! It has been asked in connection with the question of the meaning of life; and it has been asked, when the ways of mo- dern civilizationin [sic.] technicology [sic.] and business were subject to prophetic criti- cism, be it in religious, be it in secular terms. If the question is now askedin [sic.] connection with space exploration, it becomes more abstract and more urgent than before. For here the horizontal line is almost completly formalized. The task is: to go forward for the sake of going forward, endlessly without a concrete focus. Of course, one could call the desire to learn more about the cosmic space and a- bout the astronomical bodies in it, a concrete aim, but this is only an accidental sto p. [sic.] The desire to go ahead whatever may be encounteted [sic.] gives the real impetus. But as the e x c l u s i v e surrender to the vertical line in mysticism leads to the impossibility of expressing anything and acting, in any direction, so the e x c l u s i v e surrender to the horizontal line . (in what one could call "for- wardism") leads to the loss of any meaningful content and to complete emptiness. The symptoms of this emptiness are already conspicuously amongst us in form of indifference, cynicism, and despair. And the space exploration is not the means of healing it, but it may ecome [sic.] a factor in deepening it after the first enthusiasm has evaporated and the pride about man's almost divine power (Ps.8() has receded. These spiritual dangers, however, should never lead to a decision to give up either the production of technical tools or the attempt to penetrate into the outer-terrestial [sic.] space (as the danger [...] of radical mysticism should not lead to a rejection of the mystical element in every religious experi- ence) For danger is not a reason to prevent life from actualizing its potentiali- ties.--This leads to another problem, connected indirectly with our subject, the problem of the responsibility of the scientist for dangerous possibilities implied in his discoveries. The problem is as old as scholarly thought and was for mille- nia a source of conflict between the priestly guardians of the holy and the pro- phetic or philosophical critics of the traditional beliefs. Even if the socio- logical

[9] (16) logical, political and economic causes of such conflicts are taken into account, a genuine tragic element remains. The priest is aware of the catastrophic conse- quences, which criticism of holy traditions can have on the spirit of many people. But neither the prophet nor the philosopher can resign his vocation to fight for justice and truth, even if sacred [...] beliefs must be destroyed.--This is pro- bably the earliest example of the conflict between the safety of the given and {th} the risk of the new. The dangers connected with present scientific discoveries{do} do not refer to the "salvation of souls" but to the very existence of mankind. But t the problem itself and the tragic implications of any possible solution are the same. Tragic consequences of the discovery and expression of truth are no reason for giving up the attempts to discover and the obligation to express truth. The danger for the soul of the believer should not stop the profetx [sic.] or the Reformer to pronounce truth in the vertical dimension; and the danger of destructive con- sequences of scientific discoveries (including those in social sc{h}iences and psy- chology) should not stop the scientists to search for and to express truth in the horizontal dimension. It is bad to try to avoid tragedy if the prize is to avoid truth. [controversial] [Therefore, even if space explorationm [sic.] through its military implications increased the chances of tragedy, this would not be a reason for stopping it. But such danger would be a powerful motive to balance the horizontal by the vertical line, to receive weapons againstg [sic.] ultimate tragedy. In other words: The answer to th the tragic implication of the pursuit of the horizontal line is not to break off this pursuit but to continue it under the criteria coming from the vertical line. But, one asks, is this still a possibility? Has not the power of the horizontal drive, especiallyin [sic.] its scientific expressions almost cut off the relation to what transcends the universe and its scientific exploration? Has not man’s image of himself in all Western religions become obsolete by the horizontal dynamics of the last 500 years? And does not space exploration say the last word in this respect?]

[17] The period of conflicts is in principle over. The period of tolerance is not satisfactory be- cause it splits the consciousness. A period of cooperation is possible. It has started on many places and I want to express {in this} {great center of scientific creativity} my hope that it {will} may become a reality in increasing power.