Lecture XXXIX (Nr. 0527)
Facs
Transcript
[522] a affirms what he denies and denies what he affirms. And this is necessarily so. One can derive the normative structures of man as man from things which are LESS than man as man. And that's what b meant with the categorical imperative. Therefore he didn't deny not only a tyrranical God, but also psychological motives [such] as fear, as authority---which is not under criticism---and all those motives which can be brought into consideration. They all produce c. The person as person cannot affirm himself in its autonomous integrity and validity if he doesn't accept the unconditional character of the moral imperative.
Now I hope only one thing, that after I repeated this about twenty times during this hour, you do NOT confuse, from now on, the unconditional character of the d with the uncon- ditional character OF ANY SPECIAL CONTENT. Please don't do this mistake and then say, "Now for the primitives of South America, or somewhere in the desert, there, murder (or something like that) is a very much praised deed." This is not the point which I make here. I ACCEPT that, with scientific limitations, to which I may come later, but in any case this e is a reality
and is a reality which one feels even more, perhaps, when one comes from another culture (as I myself do), the European and the American. In spite of their relatedness, there are fundamental differences in the ethical contents, which one notices if one has the boundary line situation of having been a refugee once upon a time. So I don't need to be TAUGHT this, with the help of all the primitives of the world. [laughter] It is already given in the relationship of Americans and Europeans, who are only PARTLY primitives! [smiling --- laughter] But it is a quite different point.