Lecture XXXIII (Nr. 0427)
Facs
Transcript
[422] would fall under the same problem as the a and the totalitarian movements. It would not allow IN ITSELF the protest AGAINST itself. But this is just what makes b Protestant, that it permits, by its very nature--and therefore ASKS for, by it's very nature, within itself--the PROTEST against itself. How is this possible? This is possible only because Protestantism in its origin was in
the tradition of the Roman church, it still has preserved a lot of the Catholic substance--in traditions, in doctrines, in cult, in ethics--but at the same time, it has exploded and disrupted the authoritarian and, spiritually speaking, totalitarian structure of the Roman church. It has produced churches which tried to continue the original Christian tradition, especially the biblical one, and the early one, but which did not subject [i.e. submit] to any infallibility, either of the Pope or of the Protestant c, in interpreting the d. Now this was decisive. And this made it possible for e to get a quite different relationship to culture. I once wrote the sentence-- and I quote it since that time, sometimes--that Protestantism has a pathos for the f, a passion for the secular. Why? Because it belongs to the Protestant principle to see g related to the secular as much as to the sacred--we discussed that in the beginning of the lectures last
semester when I spoke of the presence of the ultimate concern in every h action. This was a Protestantism statement, a consequence of the Protestant principle. Therefore Protestantism is able to subject itself to the criticism which comes from the secular culture--in i, the j, k, and all other forms of man's spiritual l. At the same time,