[227] but which shows at the same time the interwovenness of all life processes, of all creative processes in man, and the impossibility of separating the one from the other. Let me make this clear by an application to something which happens between some of you very often, and often within each of you, namely you as philosopher have a discussion with you as theologian, or you as philosopher discuss with somebody else who is theologian and speaks as theologian, and vice versa. Now what happens in such discussions? Every theologian at a university, if he doesn't close his eyes but has contact with the university as a whole, must be drawn into these discussions. And if he tries to escape them, he shows that he is not worth to be at a university. But now what is going on in these discussions? There are two elements going on in them. One is argument---and this is the philosophical element in these discussions, and whoever enters such a discussion uses, and must use, arguments. But there is another element also in it, namely the desire to convert, the desire to communicate one's ultimate concern to the other one. And these two concerns can be together in one and the same person; the dialogue can be a dialogue within ourselves. But it is perhaps more ordinarily a dialogue between two persons. So we have these two elements. What l try to show, in the lecture especially, about the immanence of ultimate concern in philosophical attitudes and in philosophers, is based just on this insight. The naturalist ^atries to convince the theologian by arguments---whereby l mean not an ecstatic naturalist (which I would confess myself to be), but the naturalist who denies the