[217] it to science^a, history^b and philosophy.^c In which sense can one speak of the truth of faith^d, or of religion, if the truth of faith cannot be judged by any other kind of truth, neither scientific nor historical nor philosophical? The whole argument of the last two weeks was to remove the possibility of conflict, or of a judgment of the religious truth by scientific historical ^eor philosophical truth^f. But then the question is: what kind of truth IS the truth of faith?^g The answer follows from the nature of faith as the state of being ultimately concerned. It has, like the term "concern" itself, a subjective and an objective side. The truth of faith must be considered both from the subjective and the objective side. From the subjective side, one must say that faith^h is true insofar as it expresses adequately an ultimate concern. Faith is true insofar as it expresses adequately an ultimate concern. This means, from the subjective side, that one must say that faith is true insofar as its content is the really ultimate truth. The first answer, from the subjective side, acknowledges that it is true insofar as it adequately expresses ultimate concern, from the objective side, it is true insofar as the CONTENT of it is the really ultimate. So we have these two answers. The one is: it must express ultimate concern adequately. The second is: that which it expresses must really be the ultimate. Let us look at these two answers. The first answer acknowledges truth in all genuine symbols ⁱand types of faith. If a faith is expressed in a genuine symbol, it has truth. This justifies the