[132] inclined to become organicists and mechanists because they believe that this saves the concept of freedom^a, and with it responsibility, etc., which belongs to the theological concept of man. But this is not the case. Theology^b can accept a completely mechanistic method of chemical analysis for all living bodies, including the human body, without being afraid of it, because the question of that which is the RESULT of this, namely spontaneity, life, and ultimately spirit, are never dependent on the way in which the organic bearers of all this are understood in scientific terms. They can be understood in this way and that way. As a scientist and a philosopher of science, I would say it is absolutely impossible to understand living beings WITHOUT the concept of Gestalt^c. But I would ALSO say: if this concept is introduced--like SOME philosophers did in earlier times--as a special cause beside the other causes, then we come into a kind of miraculous interference into the chemical processes, which is equally wrong. Such was the character of the old vitalist philosophy, which is now dismissed by almost everybody. But if we say this is the situation with living beings, they are bearers of something which can have ultimate concern--we ourselves--how these bearers are described and calculated in terms of description and explanation cannot be dictated by theology at all. On the other hand, science^d cannot dictate, by being predominantly vitalistic or mechanistic, how this must be so that if it is this way or that way, theology^e is accepted or refuted. All this is an impossible mixture of dimensions and in no way necessary. This brings me to the last and decisive point, namely the doctrine of man--"psychology^f," as my neurologist friend Professor Kurt Goldstein^g in New York always says, doesn't exist; the only thing