[69] LECTURE VIII -- Oct. 25, 1955 The next realm we must discuss is the relationship of religion and the technical realm. The first part will deal with the logical structure of the technical realm, and then we will discuss its relationship to the religious problem. Now the first thing I have to justify is that this is the second cultural function after language^a: technology^b. This is important in relation to science^c, to which we will come after having discussed the technical realm. The world is not a totality of observed objects, but the world is a totality of usable tools--this is an important insight, that man (and not only man, but all living beings) has first of all a relationship to reality which has the character of tool, of means and ends, of using and not of contemplating. The tool-character of things precedes, in pragmatic dignity and in developmental priority, its object-character. This is especially emphasized by the philosopher Heidegger^d and is a very important part of the understanding of man and man's existence in his world. Man is not a scientific subject, but man is first of all somebody who uses things. He is first of all pragmatic, acting, before he is observing. The things are first of all FOR US, adaptable to our purposes before they are in themselves what they are, or, as we call it, pure objects. This leads to the general statement that the active relationship of man to his world precedes the contemplative relationship. This has many other consequences also, but I want first to apply this fundamental insight to the problem of the technical realm, of technology^e in general terms. What is the relationship of action and contemplation? To understand this it is good to observe an animal and to ask oneself--for instance, if one has a dog, a cat-- how are THEY dealing with their environment? Or in other terms: what IS environment FOR THEM? You will find that for the dog, in your room, only a limited amount of realities are realities at all, namely those which are related to action. Where the animal acts, there they are; but otherwise they are not... As I said, for animals, things are never things, but objects of action and not of contemplation. Therefore if we use the term "environment," we must say that for an animal, his environment has nothing to do with OUR environment. Not the same realities constitute his environment which