[62] Now such a stage is often very undefined and non-definite, and then it might go on, without too great damage. But such a repression^a is unjustifiable if a mature mind is broken in its personal center, in its integrity, by political or psychological methods of repression, of questions concerning the symbolic character of symbols^b. In this moment, the person is split in his personal unity, and he is hurt in his personal integrity--AND THIS IS THE WAY HE SHOULD NOT GO! Very often, if somebody goes this way of repression, he does not fully succeed--probably in most cases, he does not fully succeed. Then it happens that when- ever, from outside, somebody represents the freedom to understand the symbolic character of the symbols, he becomes fanatical. This is the greatest danger, and the danger of much persecution, which follows the fact that there is no completely successful suppression of the questions which are in us. But there IS suppression, or repression, even, and out of this repression the anxiety^c follows that one may be wrong, and this anxiety also is then repressed. And then if somebody represents freedom and NON-repression, then he becomes an object of fanatical attack. So let me conclude this: Not NATURAL literalism is the enemy of critical thought, but conscious literalism^d, with repression and aggresson [sic.] against autonomous thought. But one question arises, namely whether myths (or special types of myths) are able to express every kind of ultimate concern. Christian theologians, for instance, argue that the word "myth^e" should be reserved for natural myths, for this large group of mythological self-expression of the human mind in which the repetitive natural processes, for instance seasons, are understood in their ultimate meaning. And one continues saying: if, however, the word is seen as a historical PROCESS, with a beginning and an end, and a center, as in Judaism and Christianity, in Persia and Islam, then the term "myth" should not be used. In other words, the term myth should be reserved for a special type of myth. This would be a rather radical reduction of the realm in which the term myth would be applicable. Myth could not be understood any more as the language of our ultimate concern, but only as a discarded idiom of this language^f, which we cannot use any more. But this again is not valid if we look at the history of religion, including