Lecture III (Nr. 0022)
Facs
Transcript
[19]
of view that religion--or better: the act of a, in b--is the state of ultimate concern. From this follows the fundamental answer to the question of this whole [course of] lecture[s]: religion is the substance of c; culture is the form of religion.
Now after I have announced this, so to speak, as the subtitle to the whole
lecture, I come back to the relationship of these two concepts of religion, or more
intensively, these two elements in the act of faith: "ultimate" and "concern."
d drives beyond every special concern; concern drives to full concreteness.
And out of this, the other side of religion--which I did not mention last time, and
which
has raised questions in your minds--follows naturally and understandably. There would
be
no religion, in ANY way, if the concern couldn't express itself in concrete forms.
e
So we must distinguish between that which is really ultimate and that which CLAIMS
to be ultimate but is actually NOT
In traditional
Now this is one of the most important consequences following from my definition of faith as ultimate concern. It follows from it that no religion is exempted from the criterion of true ultimacy and from the temptation to replace true ultimacy by idolatry.